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Apple, Angry Birds, and Antitrust: The Direct Purchasing Requirement’s Survival
 Jacob Sherman[1] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn1)
In 2018, Google Play Store users downloaded 75.5 billion apps while App 
Store users downloaded 29.6 billion apps.[2] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn2)Google Play Store users may have downloaded 
twice as many apps as App Store users, but the App Store almost doubled 
Google Play Store’s revenue.[3] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-
4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn3) Last year, the Google Play Store 
made $24.8 billion in revenue while the App Store made $46.6 billion in 
revenue.[4] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn4)  The disparity in revenue, Killian Bell argues, is 
twofold.[5] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn5) First, it is easier to download and install pirated 
games on Android (the operating system that houses the Google Play 
Store), so many developers charge nothing for their apps.[6] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn6) Second, users of iOS (the operating system that 
houses the App Store) are more willing to pay for their downloads.[7] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn7) At least, 
some of them are. 
In 2011, four iPhone owners sued Apple Inc., the owner of the App Store, alleging the company unlawfully monopolized who could sell apps.[8] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn8) The plaintiffs argue that “they have ‘paid more for their iPhone apps than they 
would have paid in a competitive market.’” [9] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn9) Apple attempted to dismiss the 
case, arguing the plaintiffs did not have standing under Illinois Brick because they were not direct purchasers.[10] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-
4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn10)
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were direct purchasers.[11] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn11) Kavanaugh, writing for the five Justice majority, reasoned that the plaintiffs were direct purchasers because they bought apps 
directly from Apple.[12] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn12) To do so, Kavanaugh relied on the facts of Illinois 
Brick.[13] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn13)
/
 In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois sued the Illinois Brick Company alleging the company fixed prices.[14] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-
9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn14) Illinois Brick was a brick manufacturer and distributor.[15] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn15) Primarily, Illinois Brick Company sold bricks to masonry contractors.[16] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn16)The masonry contractors would then submit bids to general contractors.[17] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn17) Finally, the general contractors would submit bids to Illinois.[18] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn18) The court held that Illinois could not bring an antitrust claim, only a direct purchaser could do so.[19] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn19)For Justice Kavanaugh, Illinois Brick created a simple rule. Direct purchasers 
have standing.[20] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn20)
Apple and the dissent argue that Illinois Brick’s reasoning prohibits consumers down the chain of consumption—to whom the overcharges are passed—from 
suing.[21] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn21) Apple maintains the defendants are downstream purchasers for 
two factual reasons.[22] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn22) First, independent developers set the app price, not 
Apple.[23] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn23) Second, Apple takes a 30% cut of the price.[24] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn24) These facts combined mean developers, in theory, could pass on the cost to 
consumers.[25] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn25)
The majority rejects Apple’s pass on argument for three reasons. [26] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn26) First, 
permitting another set of plaintiffs to sue makes antitrust enforcement easier.[27] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn27) Second, the difficulty in determining costs should not prohibit this plaintiff from suing.[28] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-
4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn28) Third, Illinois Brick did not bar different classes of injured parties from suing, it only barred indirect purchasers.[29] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn29) In other words, Apple cannot rid itself of a monopoly suit just by claiming it is 
potentially liable for a monopsony suit.[30] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn30) After rejecting Apple’s argument, 
the court held that the plaintiffs are direct purchasers.[31] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn31)
 While Illinois Brick was upheld, the direct purchasing requirement may be nearing its end.[32] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn32) Justice Gorsuch, and 30 states as amici, reasoned that Illinois Brick may not further antitrust policy.[33] 
(applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn33) However, before Illinois Brick is overturned, Gorsuch has a few questions.
[34] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-F581A9A922A0#_edn34) Apple Inc. v. Pepper may clearly determine whether the plaintiffs are 
direct purchasers, but the future for online retailers and Illinois Brick is murky.[35] (applewebdata://8B3F5AC6-0F85-4D25-9481-
F581A9A922A0#_edn35)
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